0:00 On May 31, 1990, at the White House in
0:02 Washington, Soviet leader Gorbachev told
0:04 U.S. President George H.W. Bush that the
0:07 German people should decide for
0:09 themselves which alliance a unified
0:11 Germany would join. Bush initially said
0:13 he completely agreed, but when Gorbachev
0:15 wanted to put this into a joint
0:17 statement, Bush changed the wording. He
0:19 stated that the U.S. explicitly
0:21 supported a unified Germany remaining in
0:22 NATO, though if Germany chose otherwise
0:24 , the U.S. would respect that. Gorbachev
0:26 replied, "I agree, I accept your
0:28 formulation." This was effectively an
0:30 admission that a unified Germany could
0:32 remain in NATO—a military alliance
0:34 formed by the U.S. and Western Europe in
0:36 1949 specifically to counter the Soviet
0:38 Union. Just a year earlier, the Berlin
0:40 Wall was still standing, and Soviet
0:42 troops were still stationed within East
0:44 Germany. Why would a superpower agree to
0:48 The most popular answer is just two
0:52 How did a superpower in 1990 end up so
0:54 short on cash that it had to ask its
0:56 rival for help, and what did it trade
1:02 American scholar Sarah Paine has a
1:06 Paine is a professor of history and
1:08 grand strategy at the U.S. Naval War
1:10 College. In late 2023, she gave a
1:12 lecture on this topic in Washington,
1:15 D.C. On November 13, 2024, she visited
1:17 the Institute of Modern History at
1:20 Academia Sinica in Taipei to give the
1:22 same lecture in Mandarin.
1:24 She opened by saying: "So I'm going to
1:27 pose the question, why Russia lost the
1:29 Cold War, and people have loads of
1:31 different answers to that question.
1:34 So this is going to be a tour of the
1:37 I'm going to start with an answer that
1:40 many Americans have, a very simple one:
1:42 Reagan single-handedly defeated the
1:46 >> This video follows her lecture through
1:48 three key questions. First: Why was the
1:50 Soviet Union short on cash? Second: Why
1:53 didn't Gorbachev take action? Third: How
1:55 did West German Chancellor Kohl and
1:57 George H.W. Bush leverage this window of
1:59 opportunity? Paine provides the
2:01 framework, but some figures in her
2:02 lecture don't match the documents. When
2:04 we encounter these, the screen will
2:06 display her claims alongside the figures
2:08 from the documents. Looking at the
2:10 popular answer: Reagan took office in
2:12 1981, expanded the military, deployed
2:14 new missiles in Western Europe, and in
2:16 1983 proposed the Strategic Defense
2:18 Initiative to intercept incoming nuclear
2:20 missiles from space. This narrative
2:22 argues that the Soviet Union tried to
2:24 keep up and collapsed its own economy.
2:26 Paine presented a set of figures in her
2:28 lecture: "The CIA thought during the
2:31 Cold War that perhaps Russia was
2:33 spending up to 20%of its GNP on defense
2:35 . After the Cold War ended, when getting
2:38 more accurate statistics, it turns out
2:41 it was 40%and some people say up to 70%
2:46 >> Forty, fifty, or seventy percent—these
2:49 figures have no reliable source.
2:51 According to the CIA's estimates from
2:53 that era, Soviet military spending as a
2:55 percentage of total national output...
2:57 The Soviet Union first published what it
2:59 called its "true" defense budget in
3:01 1989. Soviet officials claimed it was
3:03 about 9%. The West considered this an
3:05 underestimate at the time, and later,
3:07 more reliable estimates mostly fell
3:09 between 15%and 20%. The Soviet military
3:11 burden was indeed very heavy—much
3:13 heavier than America's—but it did not
3:15 reach the levels often claimed.
3:16 Attributing all the credit to Reagan is
3:18 something even scholars who support this
3:20 view wouldn't do. A more complete
3:22 version includes both Reagan and
3:23 Gorbachev—one applied the pressure,
3:25 while the other decided to stop holding
3:27 on. Paine also listed other external
3:29 factors. In 1975, European nations,
3:31 along with the United States and the
3:33 Soviet Union, signed a security
3:35 cooperation document in Helsinki. It
3:37 contained human rights clauses that the
3:39 Soviet Union signed, giving Eastern
3:41 European dissidents a document they
3:42 could use for reference. In 1972, Nixon
3:44 visited Beijing, forcing the Soviet
3:46 Union to defend itself on both its
3:47 eastern and western fronts from then on
3:49 . After discussing these points, he
3:51 changed his approach.
3:53 And here is Arnold Toynbee, one of the
3:55 finest historians of the 20th century, a
3:58 big multi-volume history of the west, uh
4:04 civilizations die from suicide, not by
4:07 murder. So I discuss the murder, what
4:09 the United States tried to do to the
4:14 what the Soviets did to themselves.
4:18 A 20 th-century British historian;
4:20 according to this view, everything
4:22 mentioned before was the work of others
4:24 . Next is what the Soviets did
4:26 themselves, which brings us to the first
4:28 issue: why the Soviet Union lacked money
4:30 . First, look at the empire. Usually, an
4:32 empire's heartland is wealthier than its
4:34 colonies, but the Soviet Union's Eastern
4:37 Europe was arguably a
4:48 >> The "donut" effect means the outer ring
4:50 was thicker than the center; the Soviet
4:52 Union had to subsidize distant allies
4:54 like Cuba and Vietnam, and in 1979, it
4:56 invaded Afghanistan, fighting for nearly
4:58 ten years. An empire is an asset when it
5:00 makes money, but a liability when it
5:02 loses it. Looking at income, the Soviet
5:04 Union relied on oil and natural gas for
5:06 foreign exchange. In 1985, the average
5:09 cost of imported crude oil in the United
5:11 States was about $ 27 per barrel. In
5:13 1986, it dropped to $ 14—losing nearly
5:15 half its value in one year. Gaidar, who
5:17 later led economic reforms in Russia,
5:19 estimated that the Soviet Union lost at
5:21 least $ 20 billion annually because of
5:23 this. According to Gaidar, the Soviet
5:25 Union was the world's largest grain
5:27 importer at the time. Buying food
5:28 required foreign currency, and without
5:30 it, they had to turn to the West. Then
5:33 there was the planned economy itself; in
5:35 a 1989 report on agriculture, Gorbachev
5:37 admitted that up to 20%of rural
5:39 production was lost due to mismanagement
5:41 , with some items seeing losses of 30%
5:43 to 40%. The financial records of Eastern
5:45 Europe were even uglier. On October 30,
5:47 1989, East German planning officials
5:49 submitted an internal analysis to the
5:50 Politburo. It stated that East Germany's
5:53 debt to the West had surged from $ 2
5:55 billion in 1970 to $ 49 billion. Just to
5:57 keep the debt from growing further, the
5:59 standard of living in 1990 would have to
6:02 drop by 25%to 30%. The report's
6:03 conclusion was that East Germany would
6:05 become ungovernable under those
6:06 conditions. Countries running out of
6:08 money faced crises one after another in
6:11 1989. On June 4th, Poland held semi-open
6:13 parliamentary elections, and the
6:15 opposition Solidarity movement won 99
6:17 out of 100 seats in the Senate. They
6:19 swept all 161 contested seats in the
6:21 Sejm across two rounds of voting. On the
6:24 same day, Tiananmen Square in Beijing
6:26 was being cleared. On the evening of
6:28 September 10, Hungary announced that
6:30 East Germans staying in the country
6:32 could leave. As the night passed, the
6:34 border to Austria opened, and over
6:35 10,000 people left in the first two days
6:37 alone. On October 9, about 70,000 people
6:40 took to the streets in Leipzig, East
6:42 Germany. Paine said tanks weren't
6:44 deployed that day because East German
6:46 leader Honecker had already...in fact,
6:48 Honecker was still in power that day,
6:50 and authorities had mobilized police and
6:52 troops, but ultimately no order to
6:54 suppress was given. He didn't step down
6:56 until nine days later.
6:58 On the evening of November 9, the East
7:00 German government held a press
7:02 conference to announce new travel
7:06 During the Q&A, Gunter Schabowski, one
7:08 of the remaining communists helping run
7:10 the show, was asked a question he didn't
7:13 know the answer to, so he improvised.
7:16 He was asked when the regulations would
7:18 take effect, and he replied, "
7:22 Well, crowds immediately started
7:24 gathering at the six gates to the Berlin
7:26 Wall, and at one of them, the border
7:28 guards decided that discretion was the
7:30 better part of valor, and they opened
7:38 The Berlin Wall was opened late that
7:41 By this point, the answer to the first
7:44 question is clear: the Soviet Union
7:46 lacked money because its empire was
7:50 Revenue relied on oil prices, its own
7:52 economy was leaking, and the arms race
7:55 added to the burden—yet all these holes
7:57 were dug by the Soviets themselves.
8:00 As for the second question, why didn't
8:04 At every turning point in 1989, the
8:06 Soviets had troops stationed in Eastern
8:09 Europe. They sent tanks to Hungary in
8:11 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. During
8:14 the lecture Q&A, the host asked directly
8:17 : the Red Army was still there, so why
8:19 didn't they fire? AD
8:21 >> A generational shift. He said that
8:24 Gorbachev's generation saw Soviet tanks
8:26 roll into Czechoslovakia in 1968 when
8:28 they were young and felt that it was
8:31 wrong. Communism shouldn't be like that
8:35 Beyond not being able to bring
8:37 themselves to act when they came to
8:39 power, Paine also listed several of
8:41 Gorbachev's mistaken assumptions in his
8:46 He thought history would only move
8:48 forward, that socialism would improve
8:50 after relaxing controls, and never
8:52 considered that people would completely
9:00 He. He also assumed that after the
9:02 Warsaw Pact—the military alliance the
9:04 Soviets formed with Eastern Europe—
9:06 dissolved, NATO in the West would also
9:08 dissolve. He thought the U.S. would not
9:10 be happy about a unified, strong Germany
9:12 . None of these four assumptions held
9:14 true. There is a control group for 1989
9:17 : in June 1989, Deng Xiaoping ordered
9:19 the military into Beijing. The Chinese
9:22 Communist Party is still in power today
9:24 . He mentioned in the lecture that some
9:25 therefore believe if the Soviet Union
9:27 had sent tanks in time, the outcome
9:29 would have been different. Historians
9:30 have no consensus on this. Some believe
9:32 the Soviet system could have held on at
9:34 the time, while others argue the Soviet
9:36 Union could no longer afford the price
9:37 of repression. In November 2026 in
9:39 Taipei, an audience member asked about
9:41 this. His answer was that if tanks had
9:43 gone in and fired on people, the regime
9:45 might have lasted, but the result would
9:47 have been a catastrophe. When the Q&A
9:49 later touched on China, he cited the
9:51 example of North Korea, where people are
9:53 starving but the status quo persists;
9:55 the regime remains in power to this day
9:57 , while the country stays long-term
9:59 isolated and impoverished. It’s not that
10:02 there was no bloodshed within the Soviet
10:04 Union; in April 1989, Soviet troops
10:06 dispersed crowds in the Georgian capital
10:08 of Tbilisi, resulting in about 20 deaths
10:10 . In January 1991, Soviet troops opened
10:12 fire in the Lithuanian capital of
10:14 Vilnius, causing 14 deaths. However, in
10:16 Eastern Europe, on the night the Berlin
10:18 Wall fell, the Soviet troops stationed
10:20 in East Germany remained in their
10:21 barracks. In August 1991, hardliners in
10:24 Moscow launched a coup, attempting to
10:26 oust Gorbachev. Armored vehicles rolled
10:28 into the city and three civilians died
10:30 in the conflict, but the troops did not
10:32 attack the Russian parliament building
10:34 where crowds had gathered, and the coup
10:36 collapsed in three days. So, Payne
10:37 presented two overarching perspectives
10:39 in his lecture: one is that with so many
10:41 problems, the collapse of the Soviet
10:42 Union was only a matter of time; the
10:44 other is that every single factor was
10:45 essential, and without even one, the
10:47 outcome would have been different. He
10:48 quoted a Soviet deputy foreign minister
10:50 , saying that if you remove any one of
10:52 these factors, the Cold War might still
10:54 have ended, but the way it ended would
10:55 have been completely different.
10:57 According to this view, the West was
10:59 lucky. With insufficient funds and the
11:01 impossibility of using hardline tactics
11:03 , the only path left was negotiation.
11:05 Next is the 1990 negotiation table.
11:07 Recently, Knowledge Satellite’s AI
11:09 Academy launched an AI proficiency test
11:11 , which is free for the first try. I
11:13 tested at level six myself, so let’s see
11:15 what it’s testing. Dean Hi-Premier
11:16 mentioned in a post that there is no
11:18 shortage of AI courses on the market;
11:19 what is missing is a map to tell you
11:21 where you are now and what you should
11:22 learn next. The test is an AI interview
11:24 , lasting about 10 to 15 minutes. It
11:26 first asks you to choose the approach
11:27 closest to your own from six options,
11:29 then has you provide a recent practical
11:30 example, followed by persistent
11:32 questioning about the details. It looks
11:33 at what you actually do; no matter how
11:35 many tools you've used, your level won't
11:37 be higher. Afterward, two models
11:38 evaluate and compare the results,
11:40 landing at level six, described as
11:42 establishing boundaries for AI systems
11:43 to allow them to self-check, correct,
11:45 and evolve. Completing the test also
11:47 gets you a companion, NBY. If you are
11:49 worried about confidential leaks, the
11:51 official website suggests replacing data
11:52 like client names and amounts first;
11:54 your responses will not be used to train
11:56 their models. If you also want to know
11:58 which level your AI ability is at, I’ve
12:00 placed the free trial link in the
12:01 description; go take 10 to 15 minutes to
12:04 find out. Three things: how did Kohl and
12:06 George H.W. Bush take advantage of this
12:08 window? Payne believes that for the Cold
12:10 War to end on the West's terms, two
12:12 people needed to be in power at the same
12:14 time. George H.W. Bush became U.S.
12:16 President in January 1989. He served as
12:19 a naval pilot, UN ambassador, head of
12:21 the Liaison Office in Beijing, CIA
12:23 director, and spent eight years as vice
12:26 president. Kohl served as Chancellor of
12:28 West Germany starting in 1982,
12:30 eventually holding the office for 16
12:31 years, making him the longest-serving
12:33 Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
12:35 Germany. Paine described Kohl's approach
12:40 he's buying Germany out.
12:45 >> Paine described it as a tourist—a
12:48 tourist—buying up East Germany.
12:51 He cited two examples: West Germany paid
12:53 East Germany hundreds of millions of
12:55 marks for travel concessions, and gave
12:57 Hungary 500 million marks to open its
12:59 borders. That 500 million marks for
13:02 Hungary was traced to loans from two
13:04 West German banks, negotiated in
13:06 September 1989 and signed in early
13:08 October. But the then-Hungarian Prime
13:10 Minister Németh said the loan had
13:11 nothing to do with opening the borders,
13:13 and the minutes of his meeting with Kohl
13:15 in late August made no mention of it. As
13:17 for the money paid to East Germany, the
13:20 documents account for annual transit
13:22 fees and the 100-mark "welcome money"
13:24 given to every East German visitor after
13:26 the wall fell. This money made East
13:28 Germany more dependent on the West, yet
13:30 no document ever recorded it as a
13:32 transaction. Nineteen days after the
13:33 wall fell, Kohl proposed a ten-point
13:35 plan, putting the reunification of the
13:37 two Germanys on the table. Opposition
13:39 didn't just come from Moscow; two months
13:42 prior, British Prime Minister Thatcher
13:44 told Gorbachev directly, "We do not want
13:47 a unified Germany." Paine said Kohl and
13:49 George H.W. Bush split the work: Kohl
13:51 handled the money and appeasing the
13:53 Soviets, while Bush managed the British
13:55 and the French. Over the following year
13:57 , the money and the negotiations moved
13:59 forward together. In February 1990, the
14:01 first payment: with Soviet stores short
14:03 on goods, the West German government
14:05 provided 220 million marks to subsidize
14:07 Soviet food purchases from the European
14:09 Community. On March 18, East Germany
14:11 held its first free election with a
14:13 turnout over 90%, and the Alliance for
14:15 Germany, which advocated for rapid
14:17 reunification, won 48%of the vote. This
14:19 wasn't on Paine’s payment list; the East
14:21 Germans voted for it themselves. Of
14:24 course, the campaign had a clear goal:
14:26 West Germany proposed in February to let
14:28 East Germans use the West German mark,
14:31 as they had already "voted with their
14:33 feet." In the year 1989 alone, more than
14:36 340,000 people moved to West Germany.
14:38 The second payment that May. Kohl’s
14:40 foreign policy advisor flew secretly to
14:42 Moscow with two executives from Deutsche
14:44 Bank and Dresdner Bank to negotiate a 5
14:46 billion mark loan, guaranteed by the
14:48 West German government. On May 22, Kohl
14:50 wrote to Gorbachev, linking the progress
14:52 of this loan directly to the progress of
14:55 the reunification negotiations. On May
14:57 18, U.S. Secretary of State Baker listed
14:59 nine points to Gorbachev at the Kremlin
15:02 in one breath, explaining how the West
15:04 had addressed Soviet concerns. This list
15:07 is known as the "nine assurances,"
15:09 though according to the meeting records
15:11 , Baker’s own term was "nine examples."
15:13 Then came the opening scene on the 31st
15:15 at the White House; according to Soviet
15:17 meeting records, Gorbachev initiated the
15:20 challenge, saying, "You claim to trust
15:22 Germany, yet you are forcing it into
15:24 NATO. Let Germany decide for itself
15:26 which alliance to join." George H.W.
15:28 Bush replied, "I completely agree, but
15:30 the Germans have already made their
15:32 choice." After a brief exchange, Bush
15:34 said that if Germany did not want to
15:36 remain in NATO, it had the right to
15:38 choose another path, and the Helsinki
15:39 Final Act stated as much. Gorbachev took
15:42 the opportunity to propose writing this
15:44 as a joint position: a unified Germany
15:46 would decide for itself which alliance
15:48 to join. Bush revised the sentence,
15:49 stating that the U.S. explicitly
15:51 supports a unified Germany remaining in
15:53 NATO, but if Germany made a different
15:55 choice, the U.S. would not oppose it and
15:57 would respect it. Gorbachev replied, "I
15:59 agree, I accept your formulation." What
16:01 Gorbachev originally wanted was a
16:03 sentence open to both outcomes; in
16:05 Bush's revised version, the answer was
16:07 already written into the first half of
16:09 the sentence. According to the same
16:11 record, Bush then asked how to handle a
16:13 public statement; Soviet Foreign
16:15 Minister Shevardnadze said not to rush,
16:17 and no joint statement was issued that
16:19 day. However, the words were already
16:21 spoken, and subsequent negotiations
16:23 proceeded from there. On July 1, the
16:25 Deutsche Mark became the currency of
16:27 East Germany, and the two economies
16:28 unified first. On July 6, NATO issued a
16:31 declaration in London, proposing a joint
16:33 declaration between NATO and the Warsaw
16:35 Pact. The two sides were no longer
16:36 adversaries, and they even invited
16:38 Gorbachev to speak at NATO headquarters
16:40 . In mid-July, Kohl flew to the Soviet
16:42 Union to negotiate with Gorbachev in the
16:44 Caucasus Mountains, resulting in an
16:45 agreement: a unified Germany would
16:47 choose its own alliance, and Soviet
16:48 troops would withdraw within three to
16:53 As the trades get bigger, the payment
17:00 This is Paine's theory.
17:09 Documents can confirm a narrower scope,
17:11 but money and negotiation progress were
17:13 indeed tied together.
17:25 As for whether Gorbachev's every
17:27 concession was due to money, the
17:29 documents do not say.
17:35 On August 2, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Paine
17:38 says the ground war the following year
17:40 stopped after 100 hours because the
17:42 Soviet Union drew a red line, forbidding
17:44 the U.S. from toppling the Iraqi regime
17:46 . Bush and his National Security Advisor
17:48 Scowcroft later wrote that the reason
17:50 was that they did not want to change war
17:52 objectives mid-stream, did not want to
17:54 occupy Iraq, and feared the coalition
17:56 would fall apart. The Soviet Union was
17:57 not among the reasons they listed. In
17:59 September, the final and largest
18:01 transaction took place: Soviet troops
18:03 were to withdraw from East Germany.
18:05 Later, regarding the withdrawal plan,
18:06 there were over 540,000 people including
18:09 troops, their families, and civilian
18:10 personnel who had no place to live upon
18:12 returning. Who would pay for this? On
18:14 September 7, Kohl and Gorbachev spoke on
18:17 the phone, but there was no result. They
18:20 spoke again on September 10. Kohl
18:22 offered 11 to 12 billion marks, but
18:25 Gorbachev demanded 15 to 16 billion. The
18:28 final figure was 12 billion, plus 3
18:30 billion in interest-free loans. Germany
18:33 provided 15 billion in Deutsche Marks,
18:35 including building all kinds of new
18:37 apartment buildings for repatriated
18:39 Soviet soldiers going home. Why are you
18:47 >> The total of 15 billion is correct, but
18:50 it needs to be broken down. Of the 12
18:52 billion, 7.8 billion was for housing,
18:53 3.1 billion for the cost of Soviet
18:55 troops stationed there before withdrawal
18:57 , 1 billion for transport, and 200
18:58 million for vocational training. The
19:00 timeline also needs to be pushed back:
19:02 on September 12, the two Germanys, plus
19:04 the US, USSR, UK, and France, signed a
19:07 treaty in Moscow. Germany unified on
19:09 October 3, and the payment agreement was
19:11 not signed until October 9. Looking at
19:13 this year as a whole, what was bought
19:14 was the withdrawal schedule and the
19:16 Soviet Union's agreement not to block a
19:18 unified Germany from remaining in NATO.
19:20 As for this result, the choices made by
19:22 the East Germans themselves played a
19:24 large part. As for not sending in troops
19:26 , Gorbachev had already decided that
19:27 before things started; the entire window
19:29 of opportunity existed because of this
19:31 decision. Historians have varying
19:33 opinions on the relative weight of these
19:35 reasons. He emphasizes the relationship
19:37 between Kohl and Gorbachev. If you like
19:39 the topics chosen here, you are welcome
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19:53 name read at the end of the video. The
19:55 instructions for joining are in the
19:57 description box. Join us. The bill was
19:59 paid, the treaty was signed, but there
20:01 are three things that followed. The
20:03 first thing, which wasn't mentioned in
20:05 the lectures but is the most contentious
20:07 today, is that Russia has claimed for
20:08 years that the West promised NATO would
20:10 not expand one inch eastward. This
20:12 statement has a source. On February 9,
20:14 1990, Baker told Gorbachev in the
20:16 Kremlin that if US troops remained in
20:18 Germany under the NATO framework, NATO's
20:21 jurisdiction would not extend one inch
20:23 to the east. However, three points must
20:25 be clarified: Baker used a conditional
20:27 clause followed by a question; he was
20:29 asking Gorbachev which kind of Germany
20:31 he preferred. At the time, they were
20:33 discussing a unified Germany, and other
20:35 Eastern European countries were still in
20:37 the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, this sentence
20:39 was not written into any treaty. The
20:41 only thing that is truly binding is the
20:43 treaty signed in September, where
20:44 Article 5 stipulates that after the
20:45 Soviet troops withdraw, no foreign
20:47 troops or nuclear weapons will be
20:48 deployed on the territory of the former
20:50 East Germany. Article 6 clearly states
20:52 that a unified Germany has the right to
20:54 join the alliance. Regarding whether
20:56 countries other than Germany can join
20:57 NATO, the treaty does not stipulate a
20:59 single word. Experts are still divided
21:01 to this day. Kramer and Sarotte believe
21:03 the West never made promises about
21:05 NATO's future; what was said was limited
21:07 to East Germany. The Western camp
21:09 believes that although there was nothing
21:11 in writing, U.S. officials did indeed
21:12 give the Soviet Union informal
21:14 assurances. Satter, who wrote the book,
21:16 stands in the middle. He says Baker was
21:18 offering a hypothetical deal to
21:20 Gorbachev. Gorbachev himself said both
21:22 sides in a 2014 interview. He said the
21:25 topic of NATO expansion was never
21:26 discussed back then, yet added that
21:28 later eastward expansion violated the
21:30 spirit of those 1990 assurances. There
21:33 are only three things both sides agree
21:35 on. Verbal words were spoken, but these
21:37 words were not written into the treaty;
21:39 nine years later, NATO expanded eastward
21:41 anyway. The real question is whether
21:43 those words count as a commitment. In
21:45 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and
21:48 Hungary joined NATO as the second matter
21:51 . On August 31, 1994, the last troops
21:54 left Germany, four months ahead of the
21:56 treaty deadline. Kohl mentioned at the
21:59 farewell ceremony in Berlin that Germany
22:01 had provided funds to help build 45,000
22:03 new housing units. The third matter: the
22:05 Soviet Union ended itself. After the
22:07 failed coup in August 1991, various
22:09 constituent republics declared
22:10 independence one after another. On
22:12 December 1, Ukraine held a referendum
22:15 with an 84%turnout, and over 90%of valid
22:17 votes supported independence. Most
22:19 lectures do not cover this referendum.
22:21 Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy
22:23 considers it the key. He argues that
22:25 Ukrainians voted for their own
22:27 independence, not to dissolve the Soviet
22:29 Union, but a union without Ukraine had
22:31 no meaning for Russia. One week later,
22:33 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and
22:35 Belarus signed an agreement declaring
22:38 that the Soviet Union no longer existed
22:40 . On December 25, Gorbachev resigned.
22:43 There was an interval of more than 14
22:45 months between German reunification and
22:47 the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
22:49 During this time, George H.W. Bush and
22:52 Kohl made a choice. And Bush said to
22:54 Kohl at the end of it, he said, "Look,
22:56 I'm not going to beat my chest and dance
22:58 on the Berlin Wall." Both of them were
23:00 very careful never to humiliate
23:02 Gorbachev about the Soviet loss of the
23:04 Cold War. Why? Because they didn't want
23:07 to, they knew that if they did that, he
23:09 might fall from power sooner rather than
23:11 later. And the newly
23:16 independent countries in Eastern Europe
23:18 needed those 20 years to integrate
23:20 militarily, politically, and
23:22 economically with the West, so that the
23:24 cement could set before you got the
23:26 Russians trying to destabilize them.
23:30 So they bought them years to do this.
23:33 >> Regarding that "dancing" remark, Payne
23:36 says Bush said it to Kohl, but according
23:38 to Soviet records, Bush said the exact
23:41 same thing to Gorbachev in a meeting on
23:43 May 31. He said that when the wall came
23:45 down, his critics scolded him for not
23:47 being enthusiastic enough; he replied
23:49 that he did not intend to dance on the
23:51 ruins of the Berlin Wall like a little
23:53 boy. He also told his opponent directly
23:55 that he would not humiliate him. The
23:57 party that studies this moment most
23:59 intently may not be in Europe. In
24:01 December 2012, just after Xi Jinping
24:03 took over as General Secretary of the
24:05 CCP, he inspected Guangdong; official
24:07 reports spoke only of reform and opening
24:09 up. A month later, reporters wrote about
24:11 a speech circulating within the Party,
24:13 where Xi Jinping asked why the Soviet
24:16 Union dissolved and why the CPSU
24:19 He said that the proportion of Soviet
24:21 Party members was even higher than ours
24:23 , yet in the end, no one stood up to
24:26 Pan talked about something he heard
24:28 during a Q&A session in Taipei. In 2013
24:30 , he was a visiting scholar at Stanford
24:33 University. At that time, a top Chinese
24:36 expert on the Soviet Union visited,
24:38 telling those present that after taking
24:40 office, Xi Jinping summoned experts on
24:42 the Soviet Union to ask why it collapsed
24:45 , taking notes while they spoke. One of
24:47 the answers was that the Soviet Union
24:49 divided republics by ethnicity, each
24:51 with its own language, customs, and
24:53 culture; once the center collapsed,
24:56 these ready-made units could become
24:58 independent. Next was Pan's own
25:01 He believes that was when Xi Jinping
25:03 decided the genocide would be inflicted
25:06 upon China's Muslims, starting with
25:08 "Genocide" is the term he used. He said
25:11 people blocking the way were killed,
25:13 many men were imprisoned, and children
25:15 were sent to schools that were
25:16 essentially orphanages. He compared this
25:18 to what the U.S. once did to Native
25:20 Americans—it was about severing people
25:22 from their own culture. He said it was a
25:24 disgrace when the U.S. did it, and it is
25:26 a disgrace for China to do it now. He
25:28 added that China is hunting down Uyghurs
25:31 and Tibetans abroad who criticize China
25:33 , believing the lesson Xi learned was to
25:35 never take the path of openness;
25:37 economic reform can go so far, but the
25:40 priority is maintaining the Communist
25:42 Party's monopoly on power. In Taipei, he
25:44 provided a different conclusion,
25:46 focusing on the methodology. Start with
25:48 an argument, find counterarguments, then
25:50 refute those refutations. When evidence
25:52 arrives, adjust your view. He said this
25:55 This video uses that exact method with
25:57 his numbers—reading his framework
26:00 alongside these documents.
26:02 The Soviet Union collapsed from within,
26:04 but someone dared to turn a crack into a
26:06 breach before it fell.
26:09 So when thinking about why Russia lost
26:11 the war, I hope you will come up with
26:13 more complex answers.
26:18 >> Between the three forces, which one do
26:20 you think was the most critical? Was it
26:22 the Soviet Union's lack of money,
26:24 Gorbachev's inaction, or Gorbachev and
26:26 Bush seizing the window of opportunity?
26:28 Thanks to IpsCmax, Inzaghi, HealthyPrade
26:31 , Chunxuan, and Shunfeng Precision for
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