Euro - Finn Pulz · published 2 h ago ·
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Europe's New Sanctions War: Can the EU Isolate Russia?
Europe's New Sanctions War | Can EU Isolate Russia? | Ursula | European Commission | EFP
What the site found
Not propaganda · agenda: Russian energy sanctions backfire
Belief the Pravda network pushes: Bans on Russian gas, oil, and diesel hurt Europe and Lithuania more than Russia, and Russian energy still reaches Europe.
The video neutrally reports on the EU's planned 22nd sanctions package and asks whether sanctions can change Russia's economic position, noting that enforcement is difficult and Russia has alternative trade partners.
The video says · at 10:20 · quote checked against the transcript
“Europe can make certain transactions more expensive, more complicated, and more difficult.”
Europe can make certain transactions more expensive, more complicated, and more difficult.
It does not claim that sanctions hurt Europe more than Russia, and it does not distort facts. It sticks to sourced reporting (Reuters, Council of the EU) and gives a balanced account of circumvention and enforcement limits, so it does not push the 'sanctions backfire' agenda.
The Pravda stories it echoes
Closest stories from the Pravda network, by meaning. Each links to the site’s comparison with trusted Lithuanian news.
26 days ago · Western Voices: USA Softens Sanctions and Reviews Energy and Ukraine Relations Policy
M low
F low
3 verified differences
31 days ago · Everyone for themselves. The EU found a universal answer to any news again — sanctions
M low
F medium
3 verified differences
18 days ago · Europe suffers from anti-Russian sanctions
29 days ago · Brussels managed to engage in trade wars with Russia, China and USA simultaneously. Spoiler: loses on all fronts
Transcript (en, 280 lines)
0:00 Europe has announced another move in its
0:02 economic confrontation with Russia. On
0:05 November 12th, 2026,
0:08 European Commission President Ursula
0:10 Vondaan confirmed that the European
0:12 Union is preparing its 22nd sanctions
0:15 package against Russia. At the same
0:17 time, the commission is preparing a
0:20 financial proposal to cover Ukraine's
0:22 needs in 2027. two developments. One
0:26 larger strategy, Europe wants to
0:28 restrict Russia's ability to generate
0:30 revenue, access international financial
0:33 services, and obtain technology that
0:35 supports its military operations. But
0:38 there is an important question. After 21
0:41 previous sanctions packages, can another
0:44 round of restrictions actually change
0:46 Russia's economic position? or has
0:48 Russia developed alternative financial
0:51 and trading networks that make European
0:53 sanctions less effective? To understand
0:56 what is happening, we need to examine
0:58 three things. Money, technology, and the
1:01 countries helping international trade
1:03 continue. The current sanction system
1:06 developed after Russia launched its
1:08 full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
1:10 February 2022. The European Union
1:13 responded with restrictions covering
1:15 several areas. These included Russian
1:18 banks, access to European financial
1:20 markets, exports of sensitive
1:23 technology, energy related transactions,
1:26 transport, individuals and companies
1:28 connected to Russia's military and
1:30 political establishment. The objective
1:33 was not simply to punish individual
1:35 Russian officials. It was to increase
1:37 the economic cost of continuing the war.
1:40 For example, restrictions on advanced
1:43 electronics and industrial components
1:45 make it more difficult for Russian
1:47 manufacturers to obtain certain foreign
1:50 technologies. Financial restrictions
1:52 make international payments more
1:54 complicated. Energy restrictions aim to
1:57 reduce the revenue Russia receives from
1:59 selling oil and other resources. But
2:02 sanctions do not operate like an
2:04 immediate shutdown of an entire economy.
2:07 Russia continues to trade with countries
2:09 outside the European Union. Its energy
2:12 exports have also found alternative
2:14 destinations and trading arrangements.
2:17 This is one of the central challenges
2:19 facing European policy makers.
2:21 Restricting trade with Europe is not the
2:24 same as preventing Russia from trading
2:26 with the rest of the world. On November
2:29 12th, Ursula Von Delean announced that
2:31 the European Commission would present
2:33 its 22nd sanctions package and a
2:36 proposal for Ukraine's 2027 financial
2:39 needs before the next European Council
2:42 meeting. That meeting is scheduled for
2:44 the 26th and the 27th of November 2026.
2:49 According to Reuters reporting on the
2:51 announcement, the proposed sanctions are
2:54 expected to examine three important
2:56 areas. First, banks and financial
2:59 institutions. Second, cryptocurrency
3:02 platforms and digital financial
3:04 networks. Third, loopholes that allow
3:07 restricted Russian trade and financial
3:09 transactions to continue through third
3:12 countries. The important distinction is
3:14 this. As of November 12th, these are
3:17 proposals under preparation. They are
3:20 not all adopted sanctions. The European
3:23 Commission must present its proposals
3:25 and the member states must agree on the
3:27 measures through the appropriate EU
3:29 procedures for foreign policy sanctions.
3:32 This generally requires unonyimity in
3:34 the council. So the next question is not
3:37 only what Brussels wants to restrict. It
3:40 is whether all 27 EU member states will
3:43 agree on the final measures. Why are
3:45 Russian banks still an important target?
3:48 Because international trade depends on
3:51 financial infrastructure. When a company
3:53 imports industrial equipment, it needs
3:56 to pay the supplier. When an exporter
3:58 sells oil, it needs to receive the
4:00 payment. Banks, correspondent banking
4:03 relationships, and financial messaging
4:05 systems help these transactions happen.
4:08 European sanctions can restrict
4:10 transactions with designated Russian
4:13 banks and financial institutions. But
4:16 international banking is not limited to
4:18 Europe. Russian companies can seek
4:20 alternative institutions and payment
4:23 arrangements in other countries. This
4:25 creates a complicated enforcement
4:27 problem. If a Russian company cannot
4:30 make a particular transaction through a
4:32 European bank, can it route the payment
4:34 through an intermediary elsewhere? That
4:36 is precisely the type of circumvention
4:38 European authorities are trying to
4:40 address. The EU's 21st sanctions package
4:44 adopted on July 23rd, 2026 already
4:48 demonstrated this approach. According to
4:51 the Council of the European Union, that
4:53 package imposed asset freezes on 94
4:56 banks and major financial institutions
4:59 and expanded transaction restrictions to
5:02 additional Russian and non-Russian
5:04 financial institutions. The EU also
5:07 targeted financial networks connected to
5:09 sanction circumvention. This shows that
5:11 the financial restrictions are moving
5:13 beyond simply naming Russian banks. They
5:16 are increasingly concerned with the
5:18 wider networks that make restricted
5:20 transactions possible. The second major
5:23 area is cryptocurrency. Why does
5:25 cryptocurrency matter? Traditional
5:28 international payments usually involve
5:30 banks and established financial
5:32 institutions. Cryptocurrency can provide
5:35 another method of transferring value
5:37 across borders. However, cryptocurrency
5:40 is not automatically anonymous. Public
5:43 blockchains can leave transaction
5:45 records and regulated exchanges may have
5:48 customer identification and compliance
5:51 requirements. The challenge is
5:53 identifying platforms, intermediaries,
5:55 and networks being used to avoid
5:57 financial restrictions. The European
6:00 Union has already taken action in this
6:02 area. Its 21st sanctions package
6:05 included restrictions on 14 cryptoreated
6:08 service platforms based in several
6:10 jurisdictions including Georgia, Panama,
6:14 the United Arab Emirates, Kystan and
6:17 Bellarus. It also introduced the
6:19 possibility of a comprehensive third
6:21 country ban on crypto asset services
6:24 used by Russia. The 22nd package is
6:27 expected to build on this wider
6:29 approach. But there is a practical
6:31 problem. A European restriction does not
6:34 automatically close a cryptocurrency
6:36 platform operating outside European
6:38 jurisdiction. Enforcement therefore
6:41 requires cooperation with financial
6:43 regulators, exchanges, and authorities
6:46 in other countries. The question is
6:48 whether international financial networks
6:50 can be monitored effectively enough to
6:53 prevent restricted transactions from
6:55 simply moving somewhere else. This may
6:58 be the most important part of Europe's
7:00 new sanction strategy. Russia does not
7:02 need to conduct every international
7:04 transaction directly with a European
7:07 company. Trade can involve
7:09 intermediaries. A product manufactured
7:11 in one country may be sold to a
7:14 distributor in another country before
7:16 reaching its final destination. The same
7:19 applies to financial services and
7:21 technology. This creates opportunities
7:23 for sanction circumvention. For example,
7:26 sensitive industrial components may be
7:28 exported to a third country and then
7:31 redirected to Russia. That does not mean
7:33 every company in that country is
7:35 involved in sanctions of Asian. It means
7:38 European authorities must investigate
7:40 the actual supply chain, the companies
7:43 involved, and the final destination of
7:45 restricted goods. The European Union is
7:48 increasingly focusing on these networks,
7:51 and the July 2026 sanctions package
7:54 already included measures against
7:56 non-Russian financial institutions and
7:58 entities connected to these activities.
8:01 The wider question is whether the EU can
8:03 persuade other countries to enforce
8:05 comparable restrictions because
8:08 sanctions are only as effective as the
8:10 enforcement systems behind them. Now
8:12 comes the second major announcement.
8:15 While Europe is preparing additional
8:17 economic pressure on Russia, it is also
8:19 preparing financial support for Ukraine
8:22 in 2027. On November 12th, Vondlayan
8:26 confirmed that the European Commission
8:28 was preparing a proposal to cover
8:30 Ukraine's financial needs for the coming
8:33 year. This is important because
8:35 Ukraine's government must continue
8:37 financing essential public services
8:39 while the country remains at war. These
8:42 include public administration, health
8:45 care, education, and other government
8:47 functions. Military assistance and
8:49 financial assistance are related, but
8:52 they are not the same thing. Financial
8:54 support helps the Ukrainian state
8:56 continue functioning. Military
8:58 assistance supports its defense
9:00 capabilities. In a joint statement
9:03 following their meeting with Ukrainian
9:05 President Veimir Zalinski in Dublin,
9:07 European Council President Antonio Costa
9:10 and Vonda reaffirmed the EU's commitment
9:13 to continuing financial and military
9:16 support. However, the exact details of
9:19 the commission's 2027 financing proposal
9:22 were still to be presented. It is
9:25 therefore important not to confuse an
9:27 announced proposal with money already
9:29 approved and transferred. Europe is
9:31 preparing both sides of its strategy.
9:34 Increasing pressure on Russia while
9:36 helping Ukraine sustain its government
9:38 and defense. There are three realities
9:40 that need to be considered. First, the
9:43 European Union has substantial economic
9:46 influence. It can restrict access to its
9:49 financial institutions, markets,
9:51 technology, and services. Second, Russia
9:55 has alternative international trading
9:56 relationships. Countries outside the EU
9:59 continue to participate in international
10:01 trade with Russia, subject to their own
10:04 laws and applicable restrictions. Third,
10:08 sanctions enforcement becomes more
10:09 difficult when transactions involve
10:11 multiple countries, intermediaries, and
10:14 financial networks. This means economic
10:17 isolation is not a simple yes or no
10:20 question. Europe can make certain
10:22 transactions more expensive, more
10:24 complicated, and more difficult. It can
10:27 restrict access to specific technologies
10:29 and financial services. But that does
10:32 not mean it can completely stop Russia
10:34 from participating in global trade. The
10:36 real test of the 22nd package will be
10:39 whether it closes identifiable gaps in
10:42 the existing sanction system and whether
10:44 the restrictions produce measurable
10:46 economic consequences rather than simply
10:49 expanding the number of names on a
10:51 sanctions list. Europe is preparing its
10:55 22nd sanctions package. It is targeting
10:58 financial networks, cryptocurrency
11:00 services and possible sanctions evasion
11:03 channels. At the same time, it is
11:05 preparing a financial plan to support
11:07 Ukraine in 2027. But the central
11:11 question remains, can Europe turn its
11:13 economic influence into enough pressure
11:16 to change Russia's calculations? Or will
11:19 Russia continue adapting its trade,
11:21 banking, and financial networks around
11:23 European restrictions? The answer will
11:25 depend not only on what Brussels
11:27 announces, but on how effectively those
11:30 measures are implemented across the
11:32 international economy. This is Europe's
11:34 sanctions war and its next chapter is
11:37 now being prepared.
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