0:00 The idea was end the division of Europe,
0:03 but not take advantage of the Soviet
0:06 Union by moving NATO eastward.
0:08 Okay, without reliving every
0:11 aspect of this, this became the casus
0:14 belli that led to this disastrous war in
0:17 Ukraine because as soon as the Soviet
0:22 dissolved in 1991 and I was there in the
0:25 Kremlin by the way when that
0:27 was happening literally that day in
0:29 December 1991 sitting with Yeltsin.
0:34 As soon as that happened, the United
0:36 States said we won, you lost, we can do
0:39 what we want and the thing we want to do
0:42 is to weaken you further, not to
0:45 have you as a partner, not to help you
0:47 to stabilize financially, which was my
0:50 neck of the woods trying to get Western
0:52 aid and failing to do that because the
0:55 West didn't want to help stabilize the
0:57 situation. The West wanted to weaken and
1:00 ultimately divide Russia into component
1:03 parts and this is quite extraordinary.
1:06 By the way, Brzezinski, one of the chief
1:09 strategists of all of this in the 1990s,
1:11 spoke openly about Russia becoming a
1:14 confederation of three weak members, a
1:17 European Russia, a Siberian Russia, and
1:20 a Far East Russia, and they'll be weak
1:22 confederate states. It's incredible what
1:26 the CIA had in mind for Russia in the
1:28 1990s and by the way, I think until this
1:31 very moment as we speak, it hasn't
1:33 really changed. I think under Radcliff
1:35 the goals continue the same way. Well,
1:39 this is what led to war and this is what
1:41 needs to change to return to peace and
1:45 that is the first point of my peace
1:48 proposal is that NATO say publicly and
1:52 clearly that the eastward enlargement is
1:55 over. Of course, it's late in the day.
1:57 They cheated so many times, first in
2:00 Europe in 1999 and then in
2:02 in seven more member states in 2004, the
2:07 three Baltic states,
2:09 Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and
2:11 Romania. The idea was surround Russia.
2:14 And then in 2008 at the Bucharest NATO
2:16 summit, of course, the commitment to
2:18 move NATO to Ukraine and to Georgia.
2:21 Everything we have heard
2:23 from the 1990s onward was Russia saying,
2:26 don't do this. Stop this. Do not
2:29 surround us. Do not weaken us. Do not
2:32 try to break us apart. Do not support
2:34 the Chechens as the CIA clearly did. Do
2:39 try to encircle us in the Black Sea with
2:41 the NATO, meaning that Ukraine,
2:44 Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Georgia
2:46 would all surround us in the Black Sea,
2:49 something harking back to Palmerston and
2:51 Napoleon III in the first Crimean War.
2:55 So the first point is let's get this
2:59 NATO never should have expanded. NATO
3:01 promised not to expand.
3:04 political leaders in Europe know this to
3:06 be true, but they don't say it publicly.
3:10 I know that because they say it to me
3:11 privately, but they know this to be
3:13 true. So the first point is say this
3:16 publicly. By the way, this was one of
3:18 the key points that Witkow and Kushner
3:21 brought to Russia at the beginning, but
3:23 the United States doesn't say it
3:27 pathetic what the difference between the
3:30 private whispers and the public
3:32 statements are in our world to the point
3:34 of risking nuclear war. So my first
3:37 point is say publicly NATO stops its
3:41 eastward enlargement. Interestingly, I
3:44 think it's true that I saw that
3:46 Zelenskyy said yesterday, we reject
3:48 this. We reject neutrality. He's an he
3:54 in an iota the interests of his people,
3:56 by the way. And he knows that what he's
3:59 saying is the opposite of what he
4:00 himself said in 2022
4:03 in 2022 and before that. I find his
4:06 statements despicable frankly,
4:09 despicable. But aside from that fact,
4:12 NATO must stop enlarging. Point number
4:14 one. Point number two,
4:16 Ukraine must return to neutrality.
4:19 That's what this means. There will not
4:21 be a military alliance on Russia's
4:24 border with Ukraine. That's the whole
4:27 casus belli from the start. So this is
4:30 the second point is neutrality.
4:32 The third point, and I'm happy
4:35 if it's there's a way to do this. It
4:41 let me dial back a moment.
4:43 Ukraine has said it wants to join the
4:45 European Union. It was negotiating for
4:47 that under Yanukovych as well, although
4:49 the negotiations turned absolutely
4:53 putrid when the IMF started to make
4:57 demands for crushing austerity on
5:02 was the immediate economic
5:05 effect that caused things to completely
5:08 unravel and then go out of control.
5:11 That's 15 years ago.
5:15 yes, Ukraine can join the European Union
5:17 except for a major footnote these days,
5:19 which is that the European Union seems
5:22 to be turning itself into a military
5:23 block. And so the question is, can you
5:26 really join the European Union as a
5:28 neutral country? Well, it turns out it's
5:32 possible to do so because there's
5:33 actually a precedent for that or several
5:36 precedents. Several of the
5:38 European Union member states are neutral
5:41 from a military and security point of
5:43 view. Ireland is a neutral country.
5:45 Austria is a neutral country.
5:48 Sadly, Finland and Sweden used to be and
5:50 they stupidly gave it up, not because
5:52 their publics demanded it, but because
5:53 they fell into line with the United
5:57 But be that as it may, my third point is
6:00 that I say that Ukraine
6:03 should be able to be a candidate for EU
6:06 membership and Russia should agree to
6:08 that candidacy premised on it becoming a
6:12 neutral member of the European Union
6:17 or Austria. And that means that you
6:19 don't slip in the back door that you're
6:21 a EU member and suddenly you're part of
6:23 a military alliance because the premise
6:26 of the peace is that Ukraine is not a
6:30 member of a Western military alliance
6:34 can be consistent with EU membership.
6:38 let me just add it may be that Ukraine
6:40 never becomes a member of the European
6:42 Union not because of Russian opposition
6:44 but because of EU opposition. There are
6:46 countless member states in the EU that
6:48 say hell no we'll never take them in.
6:50 They'll threaten our farmers. They'll
6:52 undermine our own domestic politics. So
6:55 I have no idea whether
6:58 Ukraine will actually become a member of
7:00 the European Union and my peace proposal
7:02 is not premised on that. It is premised
7:05 on the right of Ukraine to become a
7:07 candidate without Russia's objection.
7:09 That's the third point. Then the fourth
7:11 point is is quite a knobby point not a
7:15 naughty one a naughty one because it's
7:17 hard to unravel and that is of course
7:19 the territorial issue. And
7:22 the point I want to make about the
7:23 territorial issue that people need to
7:27 Russia had no territorial designs on
7:33 at all from 1990 to 2014 never raised an
7:39 issue never said oh that's really part
7:42 of Russia. Oh that's not a sovereign
7:46 All the claims made in
7:49 the West and in the Western narrative
7:52 about this war being the reconstitution
7:55 of the Russian Empire
7:58 The reason the territory came up at all
8:02 was because of the coup in 2014 and what
8:06 that presaged about a NATO membered
8:10 Ukraine and Russia's national security.
8:13 This is crucial to understand. Of
8:15 course, what happened with the coup was
8:22 not in a very hidden way, the Ukrainian
8:26 leaders started to opine that oh maybe
8:30 Russia should leave its
8:31 naval base in Sevastopol. Maybe that
8:35 lease that we agreed to should be ended.
8:39 Well, that was the whole point of NATO
8:41 wanting to get Russia out of the Black
8:43 Sea. Again, totally reminiscent of
8:46 Palmerston's core idea in 1853
8:50 which is that the Crimean War should be
8:55 Russian the Russian Navy from the Black
8:57 Sea. So this is just a pure replay of
8:59 history. So Russia, of course, wanted
9:03 and understandably wanted to secure its
9:07 core asset in the region, its naval base
9:11 and Crimea which has a long history, but
9:14 the history goes back to 1783 when
9:17 Catherine the Great put the the naval
9:19 base in Sevastopol for the in the first
9:22 point. Crimea was retaken by the
9:24 Russians after a hasty referendum. Okay,
9:29 that is never reverting by the way
9:34 the essence of this being this little
9:40 that misplayed in February 2014 to
9:44 exactly rest Russia out of the region.
9:48 When it came to the Donbas,
9:50 the Donbas immediately
9:53 rebelled against the coup
9:57 Kyiv and said we demand our autonomy or
10:02 our independence. It wasn't clear
10:04 exactly, but we don't accept the
10:06 overthrow of our president uh this was
10:09 quite a plausible response to a coup
10:13 that had just taken place and a coup
10:16 heavily backed by the United States. Let
10:17 me just emphasize that point. This was
10:20 not a revolution of dignity. This was a
10:22 violent coup uh and a violent coup in
10:24 which the United States had his hands
10:26 all over it. Well, Russia uh
10:30 stepped in uh to uh call for a
10:33 negotiated end to the conflict through
10:36 the so-called Minsk process and the
10:39 Minsk II agreement which was reached in
10:41 February 2015 said that we don't claim
10:45 this territory. We don't claim the
10:47 Donbas. We don't want Ukrainian
10:49 territory, but this region should be
10:54 Ukraine because this is a
10:56 Russian-speaking, ethnically Russian
10:58 region and it should have autonomy.
11:02 And who was the champion of that by the
11:04 way? Angela Merkel. And very interesting
11:07 for me, uh I learned the background of
11:10 Minsk II, at least some of the
11:11 background when I visited Bolzano, Italy
11:14 uh a couple of years ago because Bolzano
11:17 is in South Tyrol, which is a
11:19 German-speaking part of Italy. It's a
11:22 German-speaking part because it was part
11:23 of the uh Austrian Empire and the
11:25 Austro-Hungarian Empire and it became
11:28 part of Italy after World War I.
11:30 And it created trouble, a German
11:33 minority area in Italy and especially
11:36 after all the disasters of World War II,
11:38 what to do with this? And the resolution
11:41 was to make South Tyrol in Italy an
11:45 autonomous region, self-governing,
11:48 German-speaking, but with the fiscal
11:50 arrangements and part of Italian
11:53 sovereignty. And it works beautifully.
11:55 It's a wonderful region. It's very
11:57 peaceful. Uh it works as part of Italy.
11:59 We had a great time vacationing there.
12:00 It's an absolutely beautiful place. And
12:03 when I spoke to the governor uh of the
12:05 region, he told me, well, of course,
12:08 Mrs. Merkel came all the time. She knew
12:10 in region. She's a German politician.
12:12 She came to campaign with the German
12:14 population in South Tyrol. And she loved
12:18 the autonomy arrangement, and she built
12:20 it in to her contributions to Minsk II.
12:23 Very interesting actually.
12:25 So Minsk II evolved in a discussion of
12:29 Germans and Russians how to handle the
12:31 Donbas. And the point I'm making in this
12:34 long digression is that
12:36 Russia was not claiming the territory at
12:39 that point. It was asking for peace
12:43 based on autonomy following a US-backed
12:46 coup in February 2014. Okay. The tragedy
12:51 is that Ukraine and the United States
12:56 absolutely opposed Minsk II despite
12:59 signing on to it, despite it being
13:02 unanimously adopted by the UN Security
13:04 Council. And so they did not implement
13:07 it. Ukraine was supposed to implement
13:09 political autonomy for the Donbas. It
13:11 did not do so. Who was supposed to
13:13 guarantee that? Germany and France in
13:16 the so-called Normandy process. They did
13:19 not do so because Europe has had no
13:21 foreign policy since 2008
13:24 in the Bucharest NATO summit when they
13:26 gave in to the United States. That's the
13:28 last day that Europe actually spoke the
13:31 truth about anything. So when it came
13:34 time to enforce the Minsk II agreement,
13:36 which was the responsibility of Germany
13:38 and France, they punted. They just let
13:42 they blamed Russia, of course, for the
13:47 Washington and Kyiv to honor an
13:50 agreement that they had just reached.
13:52 Okay. I say all of this to emphasize a
13:54 point that I think is crucial. This is
13:57 not been a war of territorial
14:00 aggrandizement. This is a war that
14:02 started because of the collapse of
14:05 inclusive security,
14:06 the expansion of the United States
14:09 through NATO, many ancillary actions by
14:12 the United States, most notably by the
14:14 way, unilaterally leaving the
14:16 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002,
14:19 thereby ending the stability of the
14:21 nuclear arms control and putting nuclear
14:24 I'm sorry, anti-ballistic missile
14:26 placements, the Aegis missile systems
14:28 into Poland and Romania. So all of this
14:32 a uh collapse in Russia's perception of
14:36 inclusive security and Russia's state
14:40 And there were not territorial demands
14:42 that were at the core of this at all.
14:45 This was not to recreate the Russian
14:47 Empire. And by the way, the phony
14:50 reading of Putin's essay on the
14:52 historical unity of Russia and Ukraine
14:55 is fascinating. If people which who
14:57 don't read by the way, if they would
14:59 read to the end of that essay, the end
15:02 of the essay says what will become of
15:04 Ukraine, of course, depends on the
15:07 Ukrainians. It's their choice. And so
15:10 the essay is the opposite of what people
15:11 say. It's not a claim that Ukraine
15:13 doesn't exist. It is a claim that
15:14 Ukraine is being used and manipulated
15:17 and the Ukrainians should make a wise
15:19 choice, which they did not make,
15:21 unfortunately, or were not allowed to
15:22 make. So the fourth point is territory.
15:24 What to do after the war? Now Russia has
15:29 uh of course uh Crimea, which I think is
15:34 even going to be an issue again because
15:37 it is at the core of this security
15:38 issue. And it is claimed for oblasts,
15:41 the two of the Donbas and Kherson and
15:44 Zaporizhzhia. And it says that these are
15:47 Russian territories.
15:49 On the battlefield,
15:50 parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are
15:53 under Russian control, parts are under
15:54 Ukrainian control. Luhansk is
15:56 essentially completely under Russian
15:58 control and most of
16:01 Donetsk is under Russian control, but
16:02 not all of it. What to do?
16:05 What I say is a little vague, but also
16:09 uh and to nobody's liking especially.
16:12 I say that there needs to be an end of
16:15 the conflict and an armistice line. I
16:18 Uh and it doesn't necessarily mean the
16:20 contact line. It means an agreement that
16:23 on one side there is administrative
16:26 control by the Ukrainians and on the
16:28 other side there is administrative
16:29 control by the Russians.
16:33 this is unsatisfactory from all points
16:35 of view uh because the Russians say we
16:42 recognition of all the claims we have
16:44 made. Ukraine says we recognize nothing.
16:48 Our de jure claim is our 1991 borders
16:51 and nothing beyond that.
16:56 my point, not quite throwing up my
16:58 hands, is to say the fighting should
17:02 and a line should be drawn and I don't
17:05 claim that this will be recognized
17:07 juridically by either side, but that it
17:10 will be an armistice line that can hold.
17:13 This is not a great solution,
17:15 but I don't regard it I could not think
17:18 of anything better uh
17:20 that would uh work.
17:22 Let me mention a couple of points. I do
17:27 borders that legal borders matter and
17:30 should not unilaterally be claimed to
17:33 Of course, there are ways that borders
17:35 can change under international law uh
17:38 through uh various processes, referenda
17:41 and so forth. So that is a point to
17:44 But I don't see how the war can end
17:48 on a basis that is juridically agreed on
17:51 both sides, whereas I do believe that
17:53 the war could end almost immediately on
17:56 a line drawn that gives effective de
17:59 facto uh control uh of uh
18:03 according to where that line is drawn, a
18:05 so-called armistice line. So this is the
18:08 those are the four points. The last
18:10 one's the toughest uh but uh
18:19 so unhappy about emptiness
18:25 as we slide to more destruction,
18:40 discussions and to watch all of those
18:43 backroom discussions add up to nothing
18:45 except further destruction and a slide
18:50 inane, dangerous, reckless rhetoric,
18:55 including grabbing Kaliningrad,
18:57 including oh, nuclear arms are a bluff,
19:00 I mean nuclear attack is a bluff and all
19:02 the stupid things that we know from
19:05 are the fuses that light the
19:09 the total wars that we're trying to
19:13 I hope that that was coherent, but
19:15 that's that's the proposal.
19:17 >> It was coherent and very comprehensive
19:19 and thank you Professor Sachs. Just a
19:21 very few comments because we're short of
19:23 time. Briefly, I remember those times in
19:25 1990 extremely well and I think one of
19:29 the fundamental problem, in fact in my
19:30 opinion the fundamental problem is that
19:34 we denied agency to the Russians in what
19:37 happened then. The events in 1990
19:40 happened because of decisions made first
19:43 and foremost by the Russians. They
19:45 decided in their own interests that they
19:48 wanted to end the Cold War. They wanted
19:50 to They wanted to do all kinds of things
19:53 that wanted They wanted major changes
19:56 within their own society and economy. It
19:58 was their choice. We didn't force these
20:00 things on them. They chose to have them.
20:03 That is one. Now, the result is that we
20:06 came very very close to achieving peace
20:09 in Europe, something we've not properly
20:11 had by the way since the end of the
20:13 Napoleonic Wars. Instead of acting to
20:17 >> Or or maybe since the disintegration of
20:19 the Roman Empire in 476
20:20 >> Well indeed Well exactly. But instead of
20:23 working hard to secure peace, we told
20:26 ourselves that we won some great
20:27 victory, and instead of securing peace,
20:30 we worked to consolidate that victory.
20:34 Everything that has happened as a result
20:36 has flowed from that fundamental
20:39 strategic error. And
20:42 the expansion of NATO and everything.
20:45 if we can get out of this, stop thinking
20:48 in this way, and aim instead to secure
20:51 peace, and that obviously means
20:53 addressing the issue of NATO expansion,
20:56 which is central to this whole topic. In
20:59 other words, if we address the issue of
21:01 security and peace in Europe, then
21:04 everything else will follow and will
21:06 fall into place. These territorial
21:08 questions, which look so intractable at
21:12 and which look impossible to solve, will
21:14 then become easy to solve. And that is
21:17 something that people just seem to me to
21:19 find very difficult to understand. But
21:22 in order for that to happen, we need to
21:24 recognize in Europe and in the United
21:27 States, but mostly in Europe because
21:29 this is our continent at the end of the
21:31 day, that we made these critical
21:33 mistakes and misjudgments of the
21:35 situation in the 1990s and thereafter.
21:40 And that we need to pursue a policy of
21:42 peace through negotiation, and those
21:44 negotiations, if they are to be
21:46 successful, must be conducted in total
21:49 good faith, which means we must stop the
21:52 situation where people whisper behind
21:54 the scenes and tell Professor Sachs, we
21:56 know this is all wrong, it is all very
21:58 bad, but we can't actually come out and
22:00 say it publicly. We need to come out in
22:03 Europe and start to say these things
22:05 publicly. Political leaders who are
22:08 failing to do that are abdicating
22:11 responsibility and betraying peace. Now,
22:14 that is my one comment because I know
22:18 deadline, Professor Sachs, but I want
22:20 you to just come in there and say what
22:21 you want to say there.
22:24 totally without even an iota of any
22:28 qualification, completely correct.
22:31 As you described the situation since
22:36 completely, totally with your very
22:39 eloquent, clear statement of why we got
22:42 into this mess. Second, I want to agree
22:45 completely with the second point you
22:48 said in passing. This is not about the
22:50 United States at the end. This is about
22:52 Europe and it's about peace in Europe.
22:55 The US got us into this situation,
22:58 absolutely. And again, I have
23:00 recommended it for years and years and
23:02 years. If anyone wants to understand the
23:04 US mindset, read Brzezinski's The Grand
23:07 Chessboard. And he explains that Ukraine
23:11 is a geopolitical pivot on America's
23:14 chessboard. And what he means by that is
23:16 it's a pawn in America's game against
23:18 Russia and against China. But the point
23:22 is this is about Europe, and Europe
23:27 understanding of how to make peace and
23:30 how it let peace slip through its
23:33 Third point I would add,
23:38 change everything. I don't know if I
23:40 don't think, and unfortunately it
23:41 doesn't seem like Mears has it in him to
23:44 do it, but Germany is actually the
23:48 protagonist in this. And I say that not
23:51 just because it's the largest economy of
23:53 Europe, because it is at the center of
23:55 this historical drama. We could go back
23:58 to World War II, but I would
24:00 just start in 1990. Germany promised no
24:04 NATO enlargement, period. It did it for
24:07 a reason, for German reunification. It
24:11 was a quid pro quo, not in some sordid
24:14 way, but it was the way to make peace in
24:16 Europe. Germany has the highest
24:18 responsibility to set this right. And
24:22 I've written open letter after open
24:24 letter to Mears. Read your own
24:26 documentary history. Look at what
24:29 your predecessor, Chancellor Kohl, whom
24:32 said face-to-face to Gorbachev. Look at
24:35 uh Hans Dietrich Genscher's Tutzing
24:37 speech. Take responsibility, Chancellor
24:40 Merkel, because you have not taken
24:42 responsibility, and your state has the
24:44 central responsibility within Europe to
24:47 get the record straight. And the fourth
24:49 point I would say is
24:52 Oh, it's what you said also.
24:59 Jeff, we can't say that right now. We
25:01 won't have a seat at the table.
25:04 They don't disagree
25:06 with the substance,
25:07 but we can't go on this way safely, just
25:12 NATO expansion was wrong, dangerous,
25:15 provocative, got us into this disaster.
25:19 Leaders of Europe today know this,
25:22 and they need to take responsibility
25:27 total disaster. That's their job.
25:33 or even what one of them said to me, but